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ABSTRACT 
This article examines whether the American cultural phenomena 
of the practice of Buddhism or the Buddhism-derived technique of 
mindfulness are likely to be helpful to the political left. It summarizes 
the central teachings of the ancient Buddhist texts, with particular 
focus on the issues of mindfulness and politics. It also reviews the 
political history of Buddhist countries. The author argues that 
although modern Buddhism has shed its historical embrace of 
absolutist monarchy in favor of republicanism, and although there 
is some ideological overlap between Buddhism and the American 
Left, Buddhism in America is too small a movement for it to be of 
much significance for progressive politics. Mindfulness appears to be 
capable of becoming a much larger phenomenon, but its separation 
from its Buddhist origins makes it also unlikely to be strategically 
important for the Left. 
Introduction 
Siddhattha Gotama, also known as the Buddha, 1 developed the practice of mindfulness 
(sat/) in the sixth-fifth centuries see as a central part of his spiritual teachings, which have 
subsequently developed into the religion/philosophy known as Buddhism. Today, Buddhism 
has some four hundred to five hundred million adherents worldwide, making it the fourth 
or fifth largest contemporary religion.3 As in the Vedic religion from which it developed 
(and which itself evolved into modern Hinduism), in Buddhism the central goal is to escape 
the cycle of birth-death-rebirth known as safTisora by both working through the kamma 
(in Pali4; Sanskrit: karma) accumulated from previous incarnations and by learning not to 
CONTACT Matthew J. Moore e mmoore02@calpoly.edu 
'The honorific title Buddha means "awakened one:" 
2See L.S. Cousins, "The Dating ofthe Historical Buddha: A Review Article; Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Series 3, 6:1 
(19%), pp. 57-1;3. 
3The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Ufe, The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the 
World's Major Religious Groups as of 2010, Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, 2012), p. 9. 
4The earliest Buddhist texts were written in a language called Pali, which bears roughly the same relationship to Sanskrit 
that Italian bears to Latin. 
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generate new kamma.5 Despite its apparently otherworldly focus, Buddhism has always had 
a political dimension. In the United States, Buddhism has increasingly become associated 
with the political left. This raises the question of whether and how Buddhism, and its secular 
offshoot, mindfulness, might relate to transformative politics.
The Buddha laid out his core teachings in his first sermon (the Dhammacakkappavattana 
Sutta6). The teachings begin with the Four Noble Truths. The first is that life is dukkha, which 
means “suffering” but also can mean something a bit less harsh: that life is inevitably and 
persistently unsatisfactory. The second noble truth is that suffering is caused by clinging 
(ta?hā; the word literally means “thirst”) to ideas, sensations, desires, and other phenomena 
of our experience. The third truth teaches that suffering can be stopped (nirodha; “cessation”) 
by learning not to cling, and the fourth identifies following the Noble Eightfold Path as the 
way to cease clinging, by practicing right understanding, intention, speech, action, livelihood, 
effort, mindfulness, and concentration.
In the Satipat??hāna Sutta, the Buddha identified mindfulness—non-judgmental pres-
ent-moment awareness—as an especially helpful path toward overcoming clinging and 
achieving enlightenment. The Buddha describes how one can build the four establish-
ments of mindfulness, which are awareness of the body (sensation), feeling (emotion), mind 
(thoughts), and phenomena (other mental activity):
Monks, this is the one-way path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and 
lamentation, for the passing away of pain and dejection, for the attainment of the true way, for 
the realization of Nibbāna [Sanskrit: Nirvana]—namely, the four establishments of mindfulness. 
What are the four? Here monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, 
clearly comprehending, and mindful, having subdued longing and dejection in regard to the 
world. [The same formula is repeated for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]….And how, monks, 
does a monk dwell contemplating the body in the body? Here a monk, gone to the forest, to 
the foot of a tree, or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs crosswise, straightened 
his body, and established mindfulness in front of him, just mindful he breathes in, mindful he 
breathes out. [Similar instructions are given for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]7
In essence, mindfulness is the opposite of clinging. One is simply, non-judgmentally aware of 
one’s experience, without either chasing after pleasant experiences or avoiding unpleasant 
experiences. The four foundations of mindfulness—body, feeling, mind, and phenomena—
collectively exhaust the possible objects of experience, so that there is nothing excluded 
from one’s mindful awareness. Later in the same text, the Buddha says that someone who 
could practice this for seven days would either achieve Nibbāna or would suffer only one 
further rebirth before achieving enlightenment.8
On the surface, it is not obvious what all of this has to do with politics, and for many years 
Western readers of the early Buddhist texts were influenced by Max Weber’s interpretation 
5Over the following two thousand years Buddhism split into numerous sects, and many more teachings were ascribed both 
to the Buddha and other enlightened teachers. One important doctrinal diﬀerence concerns whether it is better to seek one’s 
own enlightenment as quickly as possible (the view held by the Theravāda tradition), or whether someone who has nearly 
achieved enlightenment should voluntarily accept rebirth to help others escape sa?sāra (the view held by the Mahāyāna 
and Vajrayāna traditions).
6See Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Sa?yutta Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom 
Publications, 2000), 56:11, pp. 1843–1847.
7Bhikkhu Bodhi (ed.), In the Buddha's Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pāli Canon, Kindle ed. (Somerville, MA: 
Wisdom Publications, 2005), pp. 281–282.
8Bodhi, In the Buddha's Words, p. 289.
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that Buddhism was wholly apolitical.9 But, Buddhism has in fact been concerned with 
politics from the earliest texts through all eras and traditions. The early texts depict a 
state of nature, in which human society is troubled by theft, dishonesty, and violence, and 
responds by creating something very like a social contract, in which the people choose 
a leader to make and enforce laws in exchange for a share of the crops.10 That leader 
becomes the first king, and rule becomes hereditary.11 Eventually, a king comes to power 
who is concerned to make spiritual progress, and he becomes the first wheel-turning 
king, that is, one whose rule reflects and furthers the moral and spiritual truths revealed 
by the Buddha.12 The wheel is a common Buddhist symbol, rooted in pre-Buddhist sun 
symbols,13 and the title of the Buddha’s first sermon translates as “Setting the Wheel of 
Truth in Motion.”14 When spiritually good rulers are in power, society flourishes, and there 
is little crime or poverty. But inevitably, rulers will falter through ignorance and pride, 
and when they do, the people suffer and begin to misbehave. Once that cycle begins, it 
becomes self-reinforcing, until human society reaches a nadir of violence and depravity, 
which only a handful of less-morally bad people survive. Shocked by events, they commit 
themselves to moral self-reform, and start the whole process over again, culminating in 
the rule of another wheel-turning king, and followed by another inevitable decline, ad 
infinitum.15
Until 1850s, all Buddhist traditions supported some version of more-or-less absolute 
(if hopefully enlightened) monarchy, and all Buddhist-run countries were monarchies. 
Colonialism destroyed the Buddhist political tradition in some Buddhist-majority countries 
(Sri Lanka, Laos, Burma/Myanmar), while some others abandoned absolute monarchy on 
their own or in response to other pressures (Cambodia, Thailand, Bhutan, the government 
of Tibet in exile), and yet others abandoned Buddhism as their political ideology, either 
during the peak of colonialism (Japan) or before the colonial era (Vietnam, Korea). In the 
period between 1850s and roughly 1960s, under the pressure of colonialism and increased 
global competition, all of the countries that had been Buddhist monarchies in the nineteenth 
century adopted some form of constitutional, republican government, often with a mon-
arch as head of state, though with much reduced powers.16 Some modern scholars view 
this as a wholesale abandonment of Buddhism as a guide to politics, accompanied by the 
fabrication of a Buddhist republican tradition from a highly selective reading of the ancient 
9“Ancient Buddhism represents in almost all practically decisive points the characteristic polar opposite of Confucianism 
as well as of Islam. It is a speciﬁcally unpolitical and anti-political status religi on, more precisely, a religious ‘technology’ of 
wandering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant monks” (Max Weber, The Religion of India, trans. Hans H. Gerth and 
Don Martindale (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. 206.
10On the question of whether it is appropriate to call this agreement a social contract, see Andrew Huxley, “The Buddha and 
the Social Contract,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 24:4 (1996), pp. 407–420. and Steven Collins, “The Lion's Roar on the 
Wheel-Turning King: A Response to Andrew Huxley's ‘The Buddha and the Social Contract’,” Ibid., pp. 421–446.
11This part of the story appears in the Aggañña-Sutta; see Maurice Walshe, The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation 
of the Dīgha Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), pp. 407–415.
12This part of the story is told in the Mahāsudassana Sutta; see Walshe, Long Discourses, pp. 279–290.
13See Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, The Origin of the Buddha Image & Elements of Buddhist Iconography (Louisville, 
KY: Fons Vitae, 2006).
14Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Sa?yutta Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom 
Publications, 2000), 56:11, pp. 1843–1847.
15See the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta at Walshe, Long Discourses, pp. 395–406.
16For a more detailed discussion of this history, see Matthew J. Moore, Buddhism and Political Theory (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), Ch. 3, pp. 43–61.
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Others argue that Buddhism had always possessed a preference for republicanism, 
but had been forced by historical circumstances to pretend to favor monarchy.18 Yet, others 
argue that although Buddhist political thought had indeed been primarily monarchical, the 
ancient texts did contain some republican elements, and that the modern turn toward repub-
licanism represented a change in emphasis and an application of underlying principles to new 
circumstances.19 I argue at greater length elsewhere that this third interpretation is correct, but 
unfortunately do not have the space to elaborate that claim here.20 Here, I focus on a different 
but related claim: that Buddhism today has some significant ideological overlap with the 
American left, but that it is nonetheless unlikely to be a significant ally in transformative politics.
Buddhism, Mindfulness, Politics, and the Left
Since this turn to republicanism, in the period since 1960, Buddhism has been increasingly 
associated with progressive or transformative politics, particularly among American and 
European converts. Thus, for example, in the only systematic, nationwide survey of American 
Buddhists, sociologist James Coleman found that 60 per cent identified as Democrats, 9.9 per 
cent as Greens, and only 2.6 per cent as Republicans.21 The association of Buddhism with left 
politics has also been developed through the activism of people such as Vietnamese monk 
and peace activist Thích Nhất Hạnh, who coined the term “engaged Buddhism” to describe 
a combination of Buddhist spiritual practice with concern for economic, political, and social 
justice.22 Most recently and prominently, Buddhists were a visible presence in the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, as detailed in James Rowe’s contribution to this symposium.23
17See: Heinz Bechert, “Aspects of Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia,” in Tadeusz Skorupski (ed.), The 
Buddhist Heritage, Buddhica Britannica (Tring: The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989), pp. 19–27; “S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
and the Legitimation of Power through Buddhist Ideals,” in Bardwell L. Smith (ed.), Religion and Legitimation of Power in 
Sri Lanka, (Chambersburg, PA: ANIMA Books, 1978), pp. 199–211; Emanuel Sarkisyanz, “Buddhist Background of Burmese 
Socialism,” in Bardwell L. Smith (ed.) Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma (Chambersburg, 
PA: ANIMA Books, 1978), pp. 87–99.
18See: Joanna Rogers Macy, “Dependent Co-Arising: The Distinctiveness of Buddhist Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 
(1979), pp. 38–52; Trevor Ling, “Kingship and Nationalism in Pali Buddhism,” in Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky 
(eds), Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern, Collected Papers on South Asia (London; Dublin: Curzon Press, 1983), pp. 
60–73; Anthony Kennedy Warder, Indian Buddhism, 1st ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970); Laksiri Jayasuriya, “Buddhism, 
Politics, and Statecraft,” International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture 11 (2008), pp. 41–74; Kulatissa Nanda Jayatilleke, 
“Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine,” Recueil des Cours 120 (1967), pp. 441–567.
19See Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970); Richard 
A. Gard, “Buddhism and Political Authority,” in Harold D. Lasswell and Harlan Cleveland (eds), The Ethic of Power: 
The Interplay of Religion, Philosophy, and Politics, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 39–70; Aung San Suu 
Kyi, Freedom from Fear and Other Writings (London; New York: Viking, 1991); Tenzin Gyatso (His Holiness the 
Fourteenth Dalai Lama), “Buddhism and Democracy,” The Oﬃce of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, available online at: < 
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/buddhism/buddhism-and-democracy>; Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism 
Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
20See Moore, Buddhism and Political Theory, Ch. 3, pp. 43–61.
21James W. Coleman, The New Buddhism: The Western Transformation of an Ancient Tradition (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 193.
22See Rita M. Gross, “Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism (Review),” Buddhist-Christian Studies 27:1 
(2007), pp. 174–179; Ken Jones, The New Social Face of Buddhism: A Call to Action (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003); 
Sallie B. King, “An Engaged Buddhist Response to John Rawls's Law of Peoples,” Journal of Religious Ethics 34:4 (2006), pp. 
637–661; Christopher S. Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the West (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000); Action 
Dharma: New Studies in Engaged Buddhism (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); “Socially Engaged Buddhism: Emerging 
Patterns of Theory and Practice,” in Steven M. Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 2013), pp. 524–535; Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (eds), Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation 
Movements in Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
23See also: James K. Rowe, “Zen and the Art of Social Movement Maintenance,” Waging Non-Violence (2015), available online at: < 
http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/mindfulness-and-the-art-of-social-movement-maintenance/>.
There are indeed some obvious connections between Buddhism and progressive left 
politics. Buddhism advocates several principles that have been central to the American and 
European left in the period after World War II. Thus, Buddhism advocates non-violence and 
pacifism (because violence and war are both rooted in selfish delusion and contribute greatly 
to human suffering).24 It appears to advocate for something like the welfare state—indeed, 
the would-be wheel-turning king whose errors cause society to tip irrevocably into decline 
makes the fateful mistake when he fails to provide adequate support for the poor, who are 
then driven to crime to supply their needs. The Buddhist monastic community, the sa?gha, 
traditionally operated as a directly democratic community (albeit with a hierarchy of sen-
iority and experience to which deference was expected) that made decisions by consensus. 
Buddhism argued for the moral equality of all people centuries before Jesus of Nazareth did 
(even if the practices of the sa?gha retained some troubling inequalities between men and 
women). Buddhists have traditionally been vegetarians,25 argued for treating non-human 
animals as morally equal to human beings (because animals are also part of the cycle of rein-
carnation), and long urged a respectful, sustainable human relationship with nature. Finally, 
the asceticism in Buddhism, especially in the monastic tradition, clearly stands opposed to 
the ego-driven, consumerist culture of the modern West that many on the left have decried 
as ecologically unsustainable, intellectually shallow, and morally vacuous. For all of those 
reasons, Buddhism seems like a good ally for the left.
And yet, there are some reasons to be cautious about seeing Buddhism as part of the 
political left or even as a promising ally. One set of concerns is philosophical: Buddhism 
comes with baggage that makes it an uneasy fit with a progressive left agenda, and which 
many European and American Buddhists have simply ignored. Every Buddhist tradition 
believes in reincarnation not as a metaphor or an analogy, but as a fact of human existence. 
Further, although American Buddhists rarely talk this way, the Buddhist doctrine of kamma/
karma inherits from its Vedic ancestor the troubling implication that people who are born 
into lowly social positions, or who suffer greatly in life, are to some degree merely reaping 
the kammatic consequences of their own prior misdeeds. Even though many Buddhists, 
such as Thích Nhất Hạnh, identify bad government, social and economic inequality and 
injustice, and other remediable, human failings as the causes of much pain and suffering in 
the world, for kamma to have any effect or relevance, some human suffering must be the 
result of the sufferer’s prior misdeeds, and in that sense must be, if not deserved, at least 
appropriate and necessary for that person’s future spiritual progress. Further, the ancient 
texts repeatedly discourage practitioners from active involvement in politics, for example 
by prohibiting monastics from discussing politics or current events such as wars or con-
troversies,26 and prohibiting the sa?gha from ordaining anyone currently under obligation 
to the military or undergoing a criminal punishment.27 The Buddha himself rejected the 
opportunity to become a wheel-turning monarch on the grounds that it would be less 
valuable than his spiritual mission,28 and his most advanced lay disciple similarly rejected 
24See Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, Second, revised ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1974).
25Rather, Buddhists are mostly vegetarian—because Buddhist monastics traditionally beg for their food, they are permitted 
(indeed, required) to eat what is oﬀered to them, unless it is the meat of an animal that has been killed speciﬁcally for them.
26“Bhikkhus [monks], do not engage in the various kinds of pointless talk, that is, talk about kings, thieves, and ministers of 
state; talk about armies, dangers, and war…” Bodhi, Connected Discourses, p. 1843.
27See The Book of the Discipline, trans. I.B. Horner, VI vols., vol. IV (Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 1940), p. 95.
28See Connected Discourses, 4:20, pp. 209–210.
a future incarnation as a wheel -turner, on the grounds that such a life would merely dis-
tract him from making further spiritual progress.29 This historical concern about politics 
interfering with spiritual life has continued into the present. For example, in the survey of 
American Buddhists mentioned above, James Coleman found that the majority did not 
want their Buddhist groups to become more involved in politics, and activist Buddhists 
were a small minority.30 
A second reason to be cautious about the possible usefulness of Buddhism for the left is 
that, while Buddhism and Buddhists might be good allies for progressives, and while some 
progressives may individually become Buddhists or adopt various Buddhist-inspired prac-
tices, Buddhism is a marginal cultural phenomenon in the United States (US) and Europe, 
and is not in a position to make more than a tiny contribution to any movement toward a 
left agenda. In 201 Os, 1.2 per cent of the US population was Buddhist, and in Europe the 
number was 0.2 per cent.31 
This raises the question of whether the American left might get more traction from 
the larger but vaguer interest in mindfulness. In the 1980s, the American Buddhist Jon-
Kabat Zinn popularized the term "mindfulness" for the practice of non-judgmental pres-
ent-moment awareness as a therapeutic and self-actualization technique separated from 
its Buddhist roots and entanglements. He pioneered Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction 
(MBSR), a method of learning to cope with pain and chronic illness through non-judgmen-
tal awareness of one's experience. In part because of the success of MBSR, the practice 
of mindfulness has become increasingly visible in popular culture. For example, Time 
magazine's lead story in its January 23, 2014 issue was "The Mindful Revolution:' Google's 
Ngram tool, which calculates the frequency with which words appear in books over time, 
shows that use of the word "mindfulness" increased roughly 225 per cent between 1980s 
and 2000s (the most recent year for which data are available).32 Similarly, analysis of Google 
search data shows that searches for "mindfulness" increased nearly tenfold between 
February 2014 and January 2016.33 The WorldCat database of the holdings of libraries 
worldwide shows 187 books with a keyword "mindfulness" published between 1980 and 
1989, 512 published between 1990-1999, 2093 from 2000-2009, and 4878 between 2010 
and 2016.34 
The possibility of a connection between mindfulness and politics has also received a 
growing degree of attention. In recent years, there have been several books published on 
mindfulness and politics, such as Melvin Mcleod's Mindful Politics,35 US Congressman Tim 
Ryan's A Mindful Nation, 36 and Kabat-Zinn's Coming to Our Senses: Healing Ourselves and the 
World Through Mindfulness.37The US Congress now has an informal Quiet Time Caucus, which 
2~e lbid.,41:10,p.1330. 
3
°Coleman, The New Buddhism: The Western Transformation of an Ancient Tradition, pp. 227-228. 
31 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, The Global Religious Landscape, p. 50. 
32See <https://books.google.com/ngrams> (accessed January 27, 2016). 
33See <http://www.google.com/trends/explore> (accessed January 27, 2016). 
34These data are only illustrative, because a number of factors affect the results, including the fact that newer titles are more 
likely to have keywords as part of their library record and that libraries are more likely to collect newer titles. 
35Melvin Mcleod, Mindful Politks: A Buddhist Guide to Making the World a Better Place (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2006). 
36Tim Ryan, A Mindful Nation: How a Simple Practice Can Help Us Reduce Stress, Improve Performance, and Recapture 
the American Spirit, 1" ed. (Carlsbad, CA: Hay House, 2012). 
37 Jon Kabat-Zinn, Coming to Our Senses: Healing Ourselves and the World through Mindfulness (New York: Hyperion, 2005). 
meets to meditate weekly,38 and the British Parliament has an All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on Mindfulness.39
Although we can only speculate about this, it seems very likely that the popularity of 
mindfulness is due in part to its independence from the Buddhist tradition from which it 
sprang. Mindfulness, like yoga, today is frequently promoted as a technique that can be 
practiced by people who profess any faith or no faith, and it is free of metaphysical, historical, 
and political baggage. Buddhism may have spent two thousand years advocating absolutist 
monarchy, but mindfulness has not, and the question of what political implications mindful-
ness may have is currently wide open. In particular, it is not yet clear whether mindfulness 
will appeal to and be associated with the political left, as Buddhism has, or whether it will 
become a more neutral, technical practice with no particular political flavor, again like yoga 
has become. This raises the question of whether the rising popularity of mindfulness is an 
opportunity for the political left to broaden its appeal and make new alliances, or whether 
it will instead be another example of an issue nurtured in a progressive counter-culture 
and then commodified, genericized, and depoliticized to make it appealing to a broader 
audience, like organic food.
Although we obviously cannot predict the future with great accuracy, we can analyze the 
idea of mindfulness itself and explore what appear to be its likely implications for politics. 
First, what have advocates of using mindfulness in politics themselves said? Jon Kabat-Zinn 
emphasizes that mindfulness practice could influence politics primarily by helping individ-
uals to become less reactive, less stressed, and less caught up in self-righteousness:
Cultivating greater mindfulness in our lives does not imply that we would fall into one set of 
ideological views and opinions or another, but that we might see more freshly for ourselves, 
with eyes of wholeness, moment by moment. But what mindfulness can do for us, and it is a 
very important function, is reveal our opinions, and all opinions, as opinions, so that we will 
know them for what they are and perhaps not be so caught by them and blinded by them, 
whatever their content...40
Similarly, Tim Ryan, who identifies Kabat-Zinn and his work as an inspiration, mostly focuses 
on what we might call emotional and process benefits that might arise from applying mind-
fulness to politics:
We may see the humor in our mistakes and be able to laugh at ourselves more. We may be just a 
little less critical of others, and of ourselves. Or we may deal with our mistakes more quickly and 
with a more sincere and kind heart. We may more easily forgive the people who have hurt us. We 
may sit down and have civil political conversations with those who strongly disagree with us.41
Both Kabat-Zinn and Ryan see mindfulness as a process of self-investigation, and envi-
sion its impact on politics as arising from how it changes the people who engage in 
politics. Their analysis also suggests that we might expect to see changes in two main 
areas: practitioners’ dispositions and their beliefs. Thus, Ryan suggests that if we practice 
mindfulness, our dispositions may change by becoming less critical, more humble, and 
more open, and Kabat-Zinn suggests that we might see changes in the contents of our 
beliefs and/or in how we hold them. Their comments on what changes might occur, and 
38Alex Seitz-Wald, “Meet the ‘Mindfulness’ Caucus: Politicians Who Meditate!,” Salon.com, available online at: <http://www.
salon.com/2013/07/10/meet_the_buddhist_caucus/>.
39Ed Halliwell, “Can Mindfulness Transform Politics?,” Mindful, available online at: <http://www.mindful.org/the-mindful-society/
can-mindfulness-transform-politics>.
40Kabat-Zinn, Coming to Our Senses, pp. 508–509.
41Ryan, A Mindful Nation, p. 167.
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how likely they might be, are intriguing but preliminary. In this section, I examine them 
in greater depth. 
First, it is important to notice that people have some beliefs and dispositions that are 
directly related to politics, and others that are general and not directly concerned with poli-
tics. On this view, non-political beliefs are descriptive beliefs about the world with no obvious 
(direct) connection to politics, government, or policy choices. Such beliefs might touch on 
the questions of the nature of identity (am I an atomistic self or a manifestation of a greater, 
holistic something?), the functioning of causality, the existence of an afterlife, and similar 
topics. Non-political disposition refers to one's general approach to life, problems, conflict, 
decisions, and so on, without direct reference to politics. Thus, if one is generally rational or 
emotional, happy or sad, confident or uncertain, social or solitary, all count as parts of one's 
non-political disposition. In contrast, one's political disposition is how one is inclined to act in 
specifically political contexts. For example, we can easily imagine someone who is congenial 
and conciliatory at home but pugnacious and partisan at a town-hall meeting, or when 
discussing certain political topics. Finally, one's political beliefs are all those beliefs either 
about or directly relevant to politics, including one's normative beliefs generally, because 
many of one's normative beliefs will be directly relevant to political questions. Thus, political 
beliefs could include things such as the belief that members of a particular political party are 
scoundrels and knaves as well as the belief that violence of any kind is deeply morally wrong. 
What effects might mindfulness practice have on these four aspects of personality? It 
certainly seems possible that mindfulness practice might lead someone to change their 
non-political, non-normative beliefs. Mindfulness practitioners frequently report that their 
practice leads them to see personal identity as more porous and unstable than they previ-
ously thought, or to come to believe that every phenomenon is both the result of innumer-
able previous causes and a partial cause of innumerable future phenomena, such that the 
universe is united in a complex web of interdependence.42 Such changes in belief might, in 
turn, affect one's non-political disposition, for example by making one happier, less anxious, 
or less afraid of death. 
It also seems possible that changes in one's non-political disposition might lead to 
changes in one's political disposition. Such changes might be due to changes in one's beliefs 
(as above), or they might be their own independent phenomenon: for example, perhaps 
mindfulness practice leads me to become happier or less stressed, and that leads me to be 
more tolerant of disappointment and frustration. Would such changes be likely to change 
one's political dispositions? We have to consider two possibilities. In the first, the person in 
question does not make any distinction between political and non-political contexts, such 
that their disposition is always the same. In that case, their behavior in political contexts 
will change if their overall disposition changes. That seems like a reasonable conclusion: 
if mindfulness makes people nicer, for example, then it seems reasonable to think that it 
should make them nicer in all contexts. 
In the second possibility, the practitioner does distinguish between the two contexts, and 
they have different dispositions when they act politically and when they act non-politically. In 
that case, while it seems plausible, even likely, that changes to their non-political disposition 
would affect their political behavior in some way, there is no reason to think that mindfulness 
practice would lead them to modify or abandon the political/non-political distinction, and 
42For example, see Ethan Nichtern, One City: A Declaration of Interdependence (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2007). 
there is no reason to think that changes to their non-political disposition would change their 
political behavior in different ways than it would change their non-political behavior. Thus, 
they might be nicer to everyone, but there is no reason to think that they would be even 
nicer to people who had previously been their political opponents, nor conversely that they 
would be nicer to everyone except them. Similarly, if previously they had had the disposition 
that it was good to be agreeable except when important political issues were at stake, there 
is no reason to think that their new attitude would erase that distinction, though it might 
make them more agreeable, to different degrees, in both kinds of situations. Thus, changes 
to one’s non-political disposition might lead to changes in one’s political disposition, but the 
two dispositions seem likely to remain distinct if they started out that way.
Is it likely that mindfulness practice would lead directly to changes in one’s political 
disposition (assuming that one has one distinct from one’s non-political disposition)? To 
distinguish this question from the issues already considered, here, the question is whether 
one’s political disposition would change independently of changes to one’s non-political 
beliefs or non-political disposition. Thus, for example, I would have to become disposed to 
be more trusting of my political opponents but not because I had become disposed to be 
more trusting of everyone, nor because I changed my beliefs about, for example, human 
nature. Here, I think, it seems completely plausible that mindfulness practice might change 
my disposition. Perhaps, mindfulness will help me realize that I am especially inflexible in 
political contexts because I am afraid that the power of government will be used against me. 
It is a familiar experience that recognizing and being able to articulate a fear often results in 
the fear becoming less powerful. Thus, I might become less fearful, and consequently less 
inflexible. Obviously, this change does not arise because my fear is related to politics but 
rather because mindfulness may be especially helpful at teaching us to recognize and cope 
with fear, and my particular fear happens to arise in the context of politics.
To summarize the argument so far, it seems reasonable to think that mindfulness practice 
might lead to changes in our non-political beliefs, non-political disposition, and political 
disposition, either directly or by inciting changes in one area (non-political disposition) that 
spread to another (political disposition). But, now we get to what I think is the hardest ques-
tion: is mindfulness likely to change one’s political (and normative) beliefs? Here, I think the 
answer depends on what those beliefs rest upon. Thus, we can imagine that some beliefs 
ultimately rest on personal feelings or habits, some upon factual beliefs, and some upon 
what for the moment I want to call existentially basic beliefs. For example, I might believe 
(more or less consciously) that members of a particular social group are generally good and 
trustworthy people primarily because I have had pleasant experiences with some members 
of that group, and those experiences have given the group a positive emotional valence in my 
mind. In contrast, I might believe that members of some social group are unusually likely to 
be engaged in criminal activity because of what (I think) I know about arrest and conviction 
statistics. Finally, I might believe that members of some socially disfavored group deserve 
greater respect and/or equality because I am committed as a matter of principle to treating 
all people as equally worthy of respect and as deserving a chance to flourish. (The distinction 
among emotional, factual, and existential beliefs is intended to be illustrative rather than 
categorical; presumably most of our beliefs in fact blend all three elements together and 
include various unconscious and non-discursive elements as well.)
Given those distinctions, it seems plausible that mindfulness practice could affect beliefs 
rooted in emotion, primarily by making the basis of the beliefs more accessible to conscious 
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recognition and evaluation. That does not necessarily mean that such beliefs would change, 
but only that it seems plausible that they might change. In contrast, it seems less likely that 
mindfulness practice would affect beliefs based on factual information. Indeed, if anything, 
it seems more likely that mindfulness would reinforce fact-based beliefs, by encouraging 
conscious recognition of and reflection on the underlying facts and their relationship to 
the belief. To the extent that the facts are false, or that our understanding of the facts is 
influenced by emotion, then change becomes more likely, but beliefs rooted in true facts 
whose recognition is relatively free of emotional distortion seem unlikely to be affected.
By “existentially basic” I mean normative beliefs fundamental to our understanding of the 
world. (There are also non-normative beliefs that are existentially basic, but for our purposes 
they are included in the non-political beliefs category). Although such beliefs are obviously 
influenced by emotions and facts, they are not logically derived from them. For example, fol-
lowing David Hume (and G.E. Moore),43 the wrongness of murder does not appear to depend 
logically either on our feelings about murder or on any facts about murder (that it makes 
others deeply unhappy, that it is socially disruptive, and so on). Even in a case in which the facts 
or the feelings were different, most people are inclined to say, murder would still be wrong.
It seems very unlikely that mindfulness practice would affect such existentially basic 
beliefs. On the one hand, such beliefs are foundational to our understanding of the moral 
universe. Changing them would require a significant reorganization of our moral personal-
ities, which experience suggests is rare (if not impossible). On the other hand, because such 
beliefs are not logically dependent on other, non-fundamental beliefs or feelings, changes to 
our other beliefs, or to our disposition, seem unlikely to change our existentially basic beliefs. 
Indeed, it seems more likely that mindfulness practice would deepen and strengthen our 
commitment to our existentially basic beliefs. Paying careful attention to our experience, and 
learning to distinguish between transient emotions and more durable beliefs, seems likely to 
make the beliefs relatively more important. Obviously, this is not to say that no changes to 
our existentially basic beliefs ever happen, nor to deny that they might sometimes happen 
as a result of mindfulness practice, but only to argue that there is no reason to think that 
mindfulness practice is likely to result in such changes.
Earlier I emphasized that Kabat-Zinn and Ryan are focused on mindfulness as an expe-
rience of oneself. From that perspective, mindfulness is a phenomenological practice—
it examines our experience as experience, but does not make claims about connections 
between our experience and experience-independent reality. Thus, I may learn that I believe 
some things very strongly, or that those beliefs have a strong influence on my attitudes or 
behavior, but neither insight tells me whether my beliefs are true.
I believe that this may be a place where mindfulness separated from its Buddhist roots 
poses a danger. The Buddhist tradition emphasizes that human beings are subject to three 
forms of error—greed, hatred, and delusion—that cause endless problems (indeed, they 
cause all problems). It also emphasizes that neither personal identity nor any aspect of expe-
rience, either object or belief, is permanent—everything is temporary and insubstantial.44 
Although human beings obviously must nevertheless act and choose, Buddhism counsels 
43See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Revised 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
44See the discussion of the three marks (or characteristics) of existence in the Dhamma-niyama Sutta of the Anguttara-
Nikāya (III: 134); see The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikāya) or More-Numbered Sayings, trans. E.M. Hare, V 
vols., vol. IV (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1935), pp. 264–265.
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caution and humility, rather than certainty and boldness. The danger of a practice of mind-
fulness divorced from these other beliefs is that the practitioner may conclude that what they 
learn about their own experience is in fact a reflection of experience-independent reality. 
For example, if through my mindfulness practice I notice that many of my beliefs and dispo-
sitions are variable and unstable, but two or three beliefs are consistent and ever-present, 
I may conclude that those beliefs are not merely central to my experience but true. To the 
extent that this happens, mindfulness may have the effect, contrary to the hopes of Ryan 
and Kabat-Zinn, of making me less humble, less flexible, less tolerant, and less willing to 
engage with people who believe different things. That seems likely to lower my estimate 
of my opponents (who after all disagree with me only because they fail to perceive what is 
true), and to increase the likelihood of conflict and deadlock.
Thus, overall, mindfulness seems capable of affecting politics by affecting practitioners’ 
dispositions and beliefs. However, it seems very unlikely to change someone’s considered 
or foundational beliefs, and if approached as a truth-revealing activity rather than an expe-
rience-revealing activity, may reinforce both the content of those beliefs and the certainty 
with which they are held.
Conclusion
Do the growing popularities of Buddhism or mindfulness represent an opportunity for the 
left? If the analysis I presented earlier is roughly correct, then Buddhism does appear to have 
some (though not perfect) ideological overlap with the American left, but the number of 
American Buddhists remains very small. If Buddhism were to become attractive to many 
more Americans, that would probably be good news for progressives, but at the moment 
there does not seem to be any great strategic opportunity. Mindfulness as a technique sep-
arated from its Buddhist roots appears to be growing quickly, and its non-ideological and 
instrumental profile may allow it to become a much larger American cultural phenomenon 
than Buddhism. Its origin in Buddhism may make its appear to be of similar potential interest 
for the left, but the analysis presented above suggests that it may not really be so. Because 
mindfulness seems unlikely to change people’s fundamental values or beliefs, wider practice 
of mindfulness would not be likely to bring otherwise unsympathetic Americans closer to 
the left, and there is a real danger that it may encourage greater ideological rigidity and 
conflict. Thus, the “mindfulness revolution” appears likely to be politically neutral, though 
hopefully it will be of genuine personal help to its practitioners.
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